Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are increasing in flight times, ease of use, and payload sizes. Detection, classification, tracking, and neutralization of UAS is a necessary capability for infrastructure and facility protection. We discuss test and evaluation methodology developed at Sandia National Laboratories to establish a consistent, defendable, and unbiased means for evaluating counter unmanned aerial system (CUAS) technologies. The test approach described identifies test strategies, performance metrics, UAS types tested, key variables, and the necessary data analysis to accurately quantify the capabilities of CUAS technologies. The tests conducted, as defined by this approach, will allow for the determination of quantifiable limitations, strengths, and weaknesses in terms of detection, tracking, classification, and neutralization. Communicating the results of this testing in such a manner informs decisions by government sponsors and stakeholders that can be used to guide future investments and inform procurement, deployment, and advancement of such systems into their specific venues.
INTRODUCTION
The potential for using an unmanned aerial system (UAS) as a delivery platform for malicious intent is a security concern. As a result, the commercial sector has started to market detection, assessment, and neutralization systems to counter UAS. This work focuses on the testing and evaluation (T&E) of integrated counter UAS (CUAS) technologies and their components. An integrated system consists of detection, assessment, tracking, and neutralization to mitigate a UAS threat. The goal of the proposed CUAS T&E methodology is to quantify the capability of CUAS technologies to detect, assess, and mitigate small, hand-launched (Group 1) and medium, catapult launched (Group 2) [1] UAS intrusions. Figure 1 shows a sample flow chart for evaluating a new technology type through deployment. The CUAS test methodology developed at SNL establishes various performance metrics followed by an organized T&E of those metrics for each CUAS technology. After the T&E is completed, minimum performance requirements can be established for potential deployment.
TEST METHODOLOGY
Most technical evaluations of security systems or elements of a security system are tested to determine whether they meet a minimal set of performance requirements. As CUAS are a relatively new security technology, performance requirements are not finalized. We propose a preliminary set of performance metrics to test and evaluate CUAS technologies that were developed by subject matter experts (SMEs) in sensors, imagers, UAS platforms, and security analysis. As CUAS technologies mature, and sophistication of the UAS threats evolve, the proposed requirements should be re-examined.
The philosophy used to establish the number and types of tests to be conducted for CUAS T&E was driven by the need to identify the performance limitations of each CUAS tested. For this reason, every CUAS test begins with a structured set of standardized tests that are meant to establish baseline performance, followed by degradation testing, vulnerability testing, and nuisance alarm rate/false alarm rate (NAR/FAR) testing. Performance is quantified in terms of performance metrics. The resulting performance of the CUAS is then compared to the proposed requirements in the analysis of the test data. 
Standardized Testing
Standardized testing is conducted to establish a baseline performance of the CUAS under a given set of test conditions. Results from standardized tests represent an upper bound of the system's performance and are part of the first step in identifying limitations of the CUAS as well as providing consistent methods to compare system performance. In this T&E methodology, every CUAS is initially subjected to standardized testing. The performance metrics identified in Section 2.4 represent the baseline performance for the CUAS technology.
Degradation Testing
Degradation testing is performed to investigate how a system's performance degrades from ideal performance as test conditions or factors are varied. Some factors are controlled by the test team. For example, an imager's performance may degrade by 50% when a UAS is intentionally flown at a low altitude over the hot desert floor due to thermal fluctuations of the atmosphere. Degradation testing should be performed after standard testing has been completed. Other factors, such as dust, may also degrade an imager's performance; however, these types of factors are not controlled. Whenever uncontrolled degradation factors occur, these should be noted in the recorded test results.
Vulnerability Testing
There are two vulnerability principles that highlight the complexity of studying and identifying vulnerabilities. The first vulnerability principle is that every system is vulnerable to defeat. The second is that it is not possible to prove the absence of vulnerabilities in a system. The presence of vulnerabilities can be proven by experiment, but their absence cannot be shown by experiment or any other definitive means [2] .
In a mature security system, the designers strive to make the system as difficult and costly to defeat as they can given their funding, schedule, and regulatory constraints. This forces the adversary to turn to more sophisticated tactics, which reduce their chances of successfully circumventing a security system. Different types of CUAS technologies will have different vulnerabilities.
Identification of vulnerabilities can be accomplished by exploiting the sensor physics, signal processing, installation, degradation factors, or site conditions. As the results from ideal testing and degradation testing are reviewed, anomalous behaviors will be observed. The anomalous behaviors should be studied in terms of the physics, electronics, and algorithms employed by the CUAS technology. The results from the studies of anomalous behaviors will lead to proposed tests that are designed to prove the presence of a possible vulnerability. SMEs can also draw from past experience with similar technologies to help formulate testing to better characterize specific vulnerabilities. 
Performance Metrics and Definitions
In general, performance metrics are measures of system effectiveness. The performance metrics for any physical protection system include those associated with detecting an intruder and neutralizing the intruder before the intruder can complete their mission.
Because detection requires sensing, tracking, and assessment, the tests conducted to quantify sensing, tracking, and assessment performance are referred to as detection testing. Therefore, the term detection testing will include sensing, tracking, and assessment tests. The performance metrics identified in Figure 2 are used to quantify CUAS technology performance. They are measured or calculated from test results while varying specific test conditions. Sensing characterizes the capability of a sensor to react to a UAS stimulus and initiate an alarm. The following sensing metrics are used to evaluate each component of the CUAS technology.
 Probability of Sense (PS):
PS is the probability associated with the capability of the sensor to detect the presence of a UAS. Establishing a PS value for a CUAS is costly due to the number of tests required.
 Sensing Point (SP): SP is the location at which the UAS is sensed by the CUAS. The SP is characterized by coordinates referenced from the CUAS location.
 Sensing Volume (SV): SV is a three-dimensional (3D) plot of the SP coordinates from the test set that creates a volume during which the sensor can be expected to initiate an alarm caused by the presence of the UAS stimulus. Tracking is defined as the displaying or recording of successive positions of the moving UAS. Tracking position information includes the current location, speed, and heading of the UAS in real time. Depending on the CUAS sensor technology, tracking may directly affect the capability of the CUAS to assess and neutralize a UAS. The performance metrics that are used to quantify the effectiveness of a CUAS's tracking capability include calculating the quantity of tracking drops during sensing, assessment, and neutralization paths.
 Tracking Drops during Sensing (TDS):
TDS is the number of times that the CUAS fails to maintain consecutive positional information after the SP has been declared and before the assessment point (AP) is established.
 Tracking Drops during Assessment (TDA):
TDA is the number of times that the CUAS fails to maintain consecutive positional information after the AP has been declared and before the neutralization point (NP) is established.
 Tracking Drops during Neutralization (TDN):
TDN is the number of times that the CUAS fails to maintain consecutive positional information after the neutralization has been initiated until the UAS has no longer been determined to be a threat, e.g., has landed, returned to home, remained away from the site being protected.
 Tracking Accuracy (TA): TA is the measured distance between the CUAS tracking points and the actual UAS position. This value is determined by subtracting the coordinates supplied by the CUAS and the coordinates from the UAS GPS tracker. Assessment characterizes the CUAS capability to determine the cause of an alarm, specifically whether the alarm was caused by a UAS. Depending on the CUAS technology, assessment may or may not require the presence of a human operator. For example, assessment may require an operator to study an image provided by a camera to determine if an alarm is caused by a bird or a UAS. If an alarm is associated with detection of a specific communications protocol, then assessment may not require human interaction. The performance metrics used to quantify the effectiveness of a CUAS's assessment ability are as follows.
 Probability of Assessment (PA): PA is the probability associated with the CUAS's capability to determine whether the alarm was caused by a UAS or some other stimulus such as weather or wildlife. Establishing a PA value for a CUAS is costly due to the number of tests required.
 Assessment Point (AP): AP is the location at which accurate assessment occurs. The AP is characterized by coordinates referenced from the sensor location.
 Assessment Time (AT):
AT is the time required to make an accurate assessment of the cause of the alarm. The AT is measured from the sensing time (ST) to the time an accurate assessment is made.
 Assessment Volume (AV): AV is a 3D plot of the AP coordinates from the test set that creates a volume at which accurate assessment of the cause of the alarm can be expected.
The most common and most misunderstood performance metric used to quantify a physical intrusion detection system is detection. Probability of detection (PD) is the product of PS, PA, and probability of transmission (PT): PD = PS*PA*PT (1) where PT is the probability that an alarm indication will be transmitted, and PS and PA are the probability of sense and probability of assessment, respectively [3] . Assuming the security system has perfect communications capability (PT = 1), detection is dependent on the capability of the sensor's performance to declare an alarm during an adversary intrusion and the capability to accurately assess the cause of the alarm. Detection metrics are similar to those of sensing and assessment and include the following:  Probability of Detection (PD): PD is the probability of the CUAS to sense and assess the presence of a UAS.
Establishing a PD value for a CUAS is costly due to the cost to obtain PS and PA.
 Detection Point (DP): DP is the location at which the UAS is detected by the CUAS. The DP is characterized by coordinates referenced from the CUAS location. In most cases, the DP is the same as the AP due to the assumed unit probability of communication.
 Detection Time (DT):
DT is the time the UAS was detected by the CUAS. The DT is estimated from the ST to the time an accurate assessment is made. In most cases, the DT and the AT are the same due to the assumed unit probability of communication.
 Detection Volume (DV): DV is a 3D plot of the SP coordinates from the test set that creates a volume at which the sensor can be expected to initiate an alarm caused by the presence of the UAS stimulus.
UAS neutralization is defined as the capability to direct the UAS away from a security interest or to stop its forward progress toward a security interest. The neutralization performance of a CUAS is evaluated using metrics based on probability, location, and time.
 Probability of Neutralization (PN):
PN is the probability associated with the capability of the CUAS system to direct the UAS away from a security interest or to stop its forward progress toward a security interest. Establishing a PN value for a CUAS is costly due to the number of tests required.
 Neutralization Point (NP):
NP is the location where the UAS is effectively neutralized, meaning the UAS is no longer under the control of the original pilot. Ideally, the UAS is being flown/controlled by the CUAS to a specific location where the site security force can appropriately address the threat. If the CUAS technology does not have the capability to fly the UAS to a specific set of coordinates, the NP is where the UAS forward progress is halted by the CUAS and the UAS is forced to land or return home. The NP is characterized by coordinates referenced from the sensor location.
 Neutralization Time (NT):
NT is the time required to neutralize the UAS. The NT is measured from the time that the neutralization begins to the time the CUAS system directs the UAS away from a security interest or to stop its forward progress toward a security interest.
 Neutralization Coordinates (NC): NC is the specified coordinates where the UAS is effectively neutralized. This means that the UAS was managed and flown, or its forward progress toward a security interest was completely stopped.
 Neutralization Volume (NV): NV is a 3D plot of the NP coordinates from the test set that creates a volume at which the neutralization of the UAS initially occurs. If an adversary chooses to use a UAS to perform remote surveillance over a protected area, the security operations may want to prevent video information or other data from being transmitted back to a collection point. The capability to inhibit the RF data stream can be considered a form of neutralization. The same metrics cited in this section could also apply to neutralization of data transmissions or command and control (C2) transmissions.
There are two other parameters that should be measured during T&E: nuisance alarm rates (NAR) and false alarm rates (FAR). A nuisance alarm is an alarm reported by the sensor that was assessed to be caused by some stimulus other than a threat (e.g., birds or inclement weather). The NAR represents the number of nuisance alarms created per day. Unfortunately, the NAR tends to be a sensor characteristic that is overlooked or underestimated by inexperienced designers. A high NAR overwhelms the ability of the alarm monitoring staff to assess the cause of every alarm. Even if the alarm monitoring staff can assess a high rate of incoming nuisance alarms, the recognized tendency is for the staff to begin to assume that all alarms are nuisance alarms, thereby becoming complacent in a relatively short period of time [4] . This complacency can also result in the misclassification of NAR, losing the opportunity to address trends in system issues, especially when they relate to maintenance. In this condition, an actual intrusion has a very low probability of being detected, and thus, the intrusion detection system may no longer be effective.
A false alarm is an alarm reported by the sensor for which the system was unable to determine a cause. FAR represents the number of false alarms created per day. False alarms are recorded whenever UAS are not being flown. A FAR is then established by dividing the total number of alarms recorded during the collection period by the duration in days of the collection period.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
This section describes the methods used to evaluate the key performance metrics (KPMs) collected during the CUAS T&E. These are the ideal theoretical evaluation methods used when time and funding allow for enough repetitive testing to gather a statistical number of data points to calculate the probabilities described in the following sections.
Ideal Testing
In ideal testing, each CUAS design is evaluated to determine its suitability for high-security applications. If the design is not adequate, modifications to the design may be made so that the design becomes suitable. If the design is not adequate and cannot be easily modified, the CUAS is rejected and the process ends. If the CUAS design is adequate, the system is installed at an appropriate testing facility. Appropriate testing facilities include sufficient space for long distance testing, sufficient isolation to ensure civilian safety during testing, and sufficient environment to test the CUAS system in question. The CUAS is then tested according to guidelines appropriate for the CUAS system type and that allow the collection of KPM.
Ideally, the guidelines would include specific technical performance goals to evaluate during testing. As an example, a CUAS must be tested for Group 1 and 2 UAS at prescribed speed, altitude, and direction. A PD of .90 must be verified with a confidence of 95%, meaning the system detected 29 out of 29 tests [5] . Seldom is more exhaustive and expensive testing performed to demonstrate higher PD; e.g., detecting 36 out of 36 for a PD = .92; 59 out of 59 for a PD = .95; or 99 out of 99 for a PD = .97 though the number of required tests for any probability of detection can be obtained from equation 2 where CL is the confidence level, N is the number of tests, and n is the number of successful detects. A statistical number of tests are also required for PS, PA and PN.
NAR/FAR Testing
Given sufficient time and funding, NAR/FAR testing entails leaving the CUAS installed for an extended period of time to capture cyclical environmental effects, such as seasonal changes or migration patterns. During this time, all sensing alarms are recorded and, along with corresponding video records, are used to determine the cause of the alarm. In this way, nuisance sources can be identified. Alarms for which no cause can be assessed are considered false alarms. There are several required outputs from this NAR/FAR testing process; example outputs include the following: 
Degradation Factors
Degradation factors are conditions or procedures that could exist at a site that would render the performance of the sensor to be less than the PD, PA, and PN to which it was tested (e.g., PD = .90 with a 95% confidence). These factors can be related to installation (e.g., uneven terrain, presence of structures, RF background sources), the environment (e.g., fog, wind, illumination level, wildlife), procedures (e.g., failing to retest after maintenance), or other factors.
As discussed during NAR/FAR testing, the testers should retain notes on installation, maintenance, testing, and environmental factors that affect the performance of the sensor system. These factors represent the beginning of the degradation factor list. Additionally, testers should brainstorm the factors that could affect performance, but have not yet been observed during NAR/FAR testing. If needed, testing of the proposed degradation factors can be performed to determine how significant the factor is, or how sensitive a particular CUAS system is to the degradation factor. This testing can be performed during the later stages of NAR/FAR testing, or after NAR/FAR testing is completed.
IMPLEMENTATION
A hypothetical CUAS system was tested and evaluated using this methodology to demonstrate the usability of the proposed test method and KPM. The system tested is a multimodal fused system that advertises detection, tracking, assessment, and neutralization capabilities. As the system met the adequacy requirements, it was fielded in an isolated, desert terrain. This provided approximately a 7x3.5km area in which to fly the UAS systems where the area could be safely monitored for civilians. The flat, low interference area provided an ideal environment for the CUAS system testing. The sense, assessment, and detection KPMs were evaluated using a single fixed wing UAS. The standardized tests consisted of a 6.5km flight down the center of the testing area at altitudes between 300m and 550m. Given time limitations, only a limited number of tests were able to be implemented at the testing location. The KPM are shown in table 1 along with the number of tests implemented. The probabilities are all calculated using equations 1 and 2. The volumes are omitted, though can easily be obtained using the point values associated with each metric category. NAR/FAR testing was also implemented, though for a shorter period of time than is ideal due to constraints. The NAR/FAR for this system was calculated to exceed 500 alarms in a normal day. The large false alarm to possible real alarm ratio will significantly decrease the probability of assessment and, therefore, the probability of detection though the exact amount of that decrease is unknown.
Metric
Using the KPM summarized in the table above, the CUAS can easily be evaluated and compared to alternatives. It is clear that, though the detection point is ~2km away from the protected location, only a 50% probability of detection can be assured, though ideally more tests would be used to solidify that value. It is also clear, that given a successful detection, there is only a 50% chance that the adversary UAS will be neutralized. This indicates a CUAS system that will likely not meet performance requirements for deployment. All of this information can be rapidly obtained using the proposed methodology and KPM table.
CONCLUSION
Commercially available CUAS technologies need to be tested and evaluated for specific applications. The proposed T&E methodology pushes the detection, neutralization, and nuisance alarm rejection capabilities of each system to their limits and calculates usable metrics through which to compare systems. A sample CUAS was evaluated using the methodology to illustrate the simplicity of characterization through the proposed KPM and testing methods. The capabilities of the tested system were then easily summarized in a table for rapid comparisons. It is important to note that eliminating any aspect of the testing, whether it be NAR/FAR, degradation factors, or any other testing from the test methodology does not negate the need to perform and collect the information regarding those metrics.
